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CASE COIMENTS
result, rightfully ignoring the refined and academic distinction between
the meaning of common phraseology in leases.
JAMES

F.

FLEmING

LIFE INSURANCE: DISPOSITION OF PROCEEDS
BY RESIDUARY CLAUSE IN WILL
Johnson v. Remy, 220 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1955)
Henry M. Remy owned a $10,000 insurance policy on his life. The
executors, administrators, or assigns of his estate were the beneficiaries.
He died in 1952, survived by his wife but no children, and left a will
that neither mentioned the insurance policy nor contained any specific devise or bequest for his wife, who was nevertheless named sole
residuary legatee. The admission of the will to probate and the
widow's election of dower were not contested; the insurance company
appeared as interpleader to ask determination of her additional right
to the insurance benefits. By summary judgment the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida awarded the benefits to the widow, on the ground that her election of dower did not
affect her right as statutory' beneficiary of her husband's unbequeathed life insurance. On the executor's appeal, HELD, the proceeds
of life insurance payable to the insured's estate, when not specifically
bequeathed by the insured, pass by the residuary clause in his will,
and by electing dower the widow waives her right as residuary legatee.
Judgment reversed.
A Florida statute2 provides that the benefits of insurance payable
to the executor, administrator, assigns, or estate of an insured shall
inure to the benefit of the deceased's spouse and children in equal
portions, or to any person for whose benefit the insurance is declared
in the policy. The statute further provides:
"... whenever the insurance is for the benefit of... the insured,
his executors, administrators or assigns, the proceeds of the
insurance may be bequeathed by the insured to any person
FA. STAT.

§222.13 (1953).

Ibid.
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whatsoever... as he may bequeath or devise any other property
or effects of which he may be possessed, and which shall be
subject to disposition by last will and testament."
The statute saves life insurance proceeds harmless from the claims
of the testator's creditors unless they are named beneficiaries in the
policy, and a provision in the will directing the payment of the
testator's debts does not affect this immunity. 3 A specific legacy of
proceeds payable under the policy to the deceased or to his estate
passes directly to the legatee as if he had been named beneficiary, and
his rights are unimpeached by the survival of a spouse4 except to the
extent of a widow's dower right.5
Confusion arises with respect to the passage of insurance proceeds
by a general residuary clause when the deceased is survived by a
spouse, child, or children. Other states having statutes similar to
that of Florida have generally held that such residuary clauses are
not sufficient to pass insurance proceeds. 6 The rationale of this view
is that the specific legislative intent evinced by the statute is not to
be defeated by a general clause in the decedent's will.7
The Florida Court in 1917 chose to deviate from the interpretation given such statutes by other states and, in Sloan v. Sloan,8 held
that life insurance proceeds payable to an insured or his estate
passed by a general residuary clause. In that case the wife was to receive one third of all residuary property and the balance was to go
to other relatives. There were no surviving children. Subsequently,
in Lowe v. Lowe, 9 the Florida Supreme Court held that the general
terms of a residuary clause were not sufficient to pass the life insurance proceeds to the residuary legatees and that the benefits were
therefore payable to the executor in trust for the surviving children
of the insured. The Sloan case was expressly distinguished on its facts.
The basis of the distinction was not explained in the Lowe case.
3Milam v. Davis, 97 Fla. 916, 123 So. 668 (1929).

4Maclean v. Fisher, 60 Fla. 331, 53 So. 614 (1910).
5Milam v. Davis, 97 Fla. 916, 123 So. 668 (1929).
6E.g., In re Estate of Clemens, 226 Iowa 31, 282 N.W. 730 (1938); Adams '.
Garraway, 179 Tenn. 93, 162 S.W.2d 1086 (1942); see Black and Scoles, Disposition
of Life Insurance Proceeds Payable to Insured's Estate, 26 FLA. L.J. 131, 134 (1952).
-Hathaway v. Sherman, 61 Me. 466 (1872); Cooper v. Wright, 110 Tenn. 214, 75
S.W. 1049 (1903).
873 Fla. 345, 74 So. 407 (1917).
9142 Fla. 266, 194 So. 615 (1940).
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It should be noted, however, that the widow in the Sloan case was
one of the residuary legatees as well as the sole statutory recipient of
the insurance proceeds. A holding that she took as legatee and not as
widow did not severely reduce her award. On the other hand, a
similar decision in the Lowe case would have denied three of the
insured's children any benefits of the insurance policy.
In 1944 the doctrine of the Sloan case was again applied; the
Florida Court held, In re Estate of Seaton,10 that insurance proceeds
were covered by the residuary clause and thereby passed to a trustee
in accordance with the directions of the testator. The Court held that
"The rule of Sloan v. Sloan . . . is in full force ...

in cases where it

applies, and is the settled construction of the court on the statute involved."17 The language of the Seaton case does not effectively
reflect a choice between the Sloan and Lowe theories. The Sloan decision is only "in full force" when the court decides that "it applies,"
and its effect may be avoided simply by applying the Lowe case instead.
The federal district court was unable to resolve the dilemma and in
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Jones"- followed the Seaton case
only because it was decided subsequently to the Lowe decision. In
so doing the court confessed that it was "unable to find any legal
basis for the apparent conflict, as is indicated in the Lowe and Seaton
cases." 13
The federal court was called upon to decide the instant case with
no means of determining which of the previous decisions should
govern. The court of appeals followed the Pacific Mutual decision
and adopted the Seaton theory, holding that the residuary clause
passed the insurance proceeds and that Mrs. Remy's right to the
benefits emanated from her status as residuary legatee, not from her
status as widow. Her election of dower therefore waived her right to
the insurance benefits as surely as if they had been specifically bequeathed to her.
The instant decision neither aids nor hinders accurate interpretation of the statute. Until the Sloan or the Lowe case is overruled litigants in the federal courts must find satisfaction in the uncertain commitment of the PacificMutual decision, and those in the Florida courts
have no basis for ascertaining which of the two apparently conflicting
theories will be applied.
10154 Fla. 446, 18 So.2d 20 (1944).
id. at 449, 18 So.2d at 22.
12100 F. Supp. 466 (N.D. Fla. 1951).
tald."at 468.
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